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CREDIT RATING AGENCIES & FREE SPEECH 
INTRODUCTION 
by 
Atka Bramhandkar* 
Marlene Barken** 
Gwen Seaquist*** 
The economic crisis that emerged in late 2007 continues to 
occupy an important place in many political and non-political 
discussions and can be traced to a number of players. The role 
many financial institutions, mortgage brokers, appraisers, and 
speculators played is well documented. Individual borrowers 
also contributed to this sub-prime lending crisis either 
knowingly or unwittingly through participation in the fraud 
committed by other parties. Several experts have put the blame 
squarely on the politicians who promoted home-ownership as 
the ultimate measure of success in American society and the 
government agencies (e.g. Fannie Mae) that were charged with 
assisting in the process of making these home ownership 
dreams come true. 
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Even the most respected Federal Reserve ex-Chairman, Alan 
Greenspan, has not escaped criticism on account of his policy 
of keeping interest rates low for a long time. Recently, some 
investors and economists have pointed to the pivotal part credit 
rating agencies played in the meltdown. This paper will 
examine that role, focusing on whether credit rating agencies 
should be able to avoid liability by virtue of their traditional 
protection under the First Amendment, and whether new 
regulatory reforms designed to curtail conflicts of interest and 
promote greater disclosure will suffice. 
WHAT ARE CREDIT RATINGS & WHY ARE THEY 
IMPORTANT? 
The easiest way to understand credit ratings is to compare 
them to the grade point averages (GPA) given out by most 
schools. Earning a GP A of "A" is excellent whereas receiving 
a GP A of "D" is bad. Each of the major rating agencies have 
their own categories akin to the As and Bs a student gets in 
his/her coursework. For example, Standard & Poor's (S & P) 
gives the highest rating of AAA for a debt issuer with stellar 
financial performance. A rating of "B" is given to an issuer 
whose debt issue servicing may be considered speculative. 
Moody's follows a similar method with Triple A (Aaa) as the 
best possible rating and a rating of "B 1" indicating 
questionable ability of the borrower to pay interest and 
principal on the debt in a timely manner. 
These ratings are usually paid for by the issuers instead of 
by the investors of debt. Scannell & Lucchetti report in their 
2008 article that about 98 percent of the ratings are paid for by 
the issuers. 1 Some issuers routinely shop around for a better 
rating. A high rating can translate into lower interest rate and 
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significant savings over the life of the debt issue. Acceptable 
ratings can also lead to a larger pool of investors who would be 
interested in buying these bonds, thereby creating a liquid 
secondary market. It is not uncommon for the debt issuer to 
buy additional insurance to make its debt issue with a lower 
credit rating more acceptable for the prospective investors.2 
Investors rely on these ratings to get an objective 
assessment of the debt's quality. Some debt investors who are 
regulated are prohibited from investing in non-investment 
grade bonds. "The Federal Reserve defines investment-grade 
securities as those rated BBB- or higher by at least one of the 
three principal credit ratings agencies and no lower than that by 
the others."3 For banks choosing to invest in non-investment-
grade bonds, the penalty comes in the form of higher capital 
ratios. Prior to the creation of the new derivative products like 
the Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDOs) and Collateralized 
Mortgage Obligations (CMOs), assigning a rating to a bond 
issue was a relatively simple process. 
In a traditional credit analysis, the ratings agencies focus on 
the four major C's of credit. The four C's refer to: capacity, 
collateral, covenants, and character. The questions about 
"Capacity" revolve around the issuer's ability to pay back the 
debt as promised. The ratings analyst may look at a variety of 
financial and nonfinancial information about the issuing 
company. Rating agencies examine the historical financial 
statements, calculate relevant traditional and cash flow based 
ratios, and compare the issuer's performance over time to its 
peers, and to the industry in which the issuer operates. In 
addition, qualitative judgment is used to evaluate several 
factors which could affect a company's ability to service its 
debt such as the trends in the industry in which the company 
operates, its competitive position and any relevant regulatory 
factors which could impact its operations. The second "C" in 
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the analysis, namely collateral, is based on the examination of 
the creditors' rights in the event the issuer goes bankrupt or 
files for a reorganization plan. A study of "Covenants" focuses 
on any limitations that may be imposed on the borrower' s 
activities. The last "C" refers to the character of the borrower. 
This part of the evaluation is based on the qualitative judgment 
of the company's management. A range of factors such as the 
ownership structure, shareholder rights, public disclosure, and 
the structure of the board may be used to assign a character 
score to the issuer. 4 
Ratings have been used by regulators since the thirties, but 
in the seventies, the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) 
gave them new power. There are ten Nationally Recognized 
Statistical Rating Organizations (NRSROs), including the big 
three, Standard and Poor's (S&P), Moody's and Fitch. Their 
role is to channel funds into supposedly safe and secure 
investments. Issuers must obtain a rating, which in tum 
dictates where banks, insurance companies, money-market 
funds and the like can place their money. While these 
regulatory requirements were intended to protect investors, the 
net effect was to turn the "opinion" rating agencies into 
essential gatekeepers. 5 Then in the late 1990s, the role of 
rating agencies underwent a significant change as the newly 
created derivative products were introduced. 
THE NATURE OF DERIVATIVE PRODUCTS AND THE 
RATINGS GAME 
Mortgage-backed securities (also known as CMOs) come 
into existence when a financial institution puts many of the 
mortgages they own or bought into an investment pool. These 
pools are sometimes sliced and diced into different classes of 
securities with varying levels of risk and return. The risk 
levels, for example, may be based on the probabilities of 
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default and which class of investors would bear the first x 
percent of the default. One of the major advantages of 
securitizations is creation of liquidity which allowed lenders to 
keep giving out loans after selling the loans already on their 
books. It was believed that these securities were quite safe as 
they were backed by several thousand loans and the probability 
that all these loans could simultaneously default was slim to 
none. 
The ratings given to these CMOs were necessary for the 
financial institutions to be able to sell them to organizations 
like pension funds and banks which had restrictions on the 
securities in which they could invest. As described below, the 
ratings "game" now being played was quite different from the 
ratings that agencies previously had issued for bonds of 
companies like Enron. 
For traditional bond issues, the focus is placed on the 
borrowers' ability to run their business and generate cash flows 
to pay the interest and principal to the debt investors. All the 
financial information needed to calculate the relevant ratios is 
retrieved from the company's audited financial statements. A 
publicly traded company is required to hire an independent 
audit firm which certifies that the financial statements follow 
the Generally Accepted Financial Principles (GAAP) and 
accurately depict what a firm owes and owns on its balance 
sheet. The audited income statement looks at the revenue and 
expense recognition standards followed by the company and 
produces net income after tax generated by the company over a 
12 month time period. The credit rating agencies came under 
tremendous criticism for holding on to the best possible triple 
A ratings for Enron bonds just prior to Enron declaring 
bankruptcy. At that time, ratings agencies claimed that they 
should not bear any blame because companies like Enron were 
engaged in fraudulent bookkeeping with total cooperation from 
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their auditors. The "cooked" financial statements painted a 
significantly better financial picture of Enron compared to the 
reality. Enron's management, with help from its auditors, had 
created thousands of Special Purpose Entities (SPEs) whose 
sole purpose was to take the debt off Enron's balance sheet. 
The ratings agencies relied heavily on the "window dressed" 
financial statements certified by the company's auditors, and 
they successfully defended themselves in court, arguing that 
they had no reason to independently investigate if Enron had 
taken deliberate steps to hide debt from its balance sheet. 6 
The ratings assigned to derivative products like the CMOs 
could not be figured out using the same technique. These 
securities were backed by thousands of mortgages spread over 
many geographic locations and borrowers. It was next to 
impossible to verify the details of each and every mortgage. 
The practice of continuously slicing and dicing the bundled 
securities to create more securities exacerbated this problem 
even more as one mortgage debt might now be backing more 
than a couple of CMO's. The rating agencies had to get their 
information from the investment banks that created the pooled 
securities. The rating agencies also assumed, erroneously, that 
housing prices would continue their upward movement 
indefinitely, minimizing the chance of even subprime 
borrowers defaulting on their loans. 
Another significant difference between the processes used 
for assigning ratings to traditional corporate bonds versus the 
ratings assigned to structured products lies in the differences in 
the customer base for these products. The ratings agencies 
have a lot more control over ratings for bonds as they have 
many clients with no single client providing a significant 
source of revenue. On the other hand, derivative securities 
were put together by only a handful of investment banks whose 
loss as clients would mean a huge loss of revenue to the ratings 
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agencies. This concentration of clients put tremendous 
pressure on ratings agencies to assign favorable ratings to some 
structured products to please their clients. 7 
Investors who relied on these ratings are now seeking to 
hold the rating agencies responsible for the losses generated by 
these CMOs & CDOs as the real estate market all over the 
world went into a freefall leading to simultaneous defaults on 
thousands of loans. In the past, ratings agencies have 
successfully argued that their opinions are not actionable and 
are analogous to that of a stock analyst who issues buy or sell 
recommendations. Moreover, the worldwide economic 
conditions are completely unprecedented. Interestingly, legal 
counsel representing Fitch in its testimony to Congress, called 
ratings the "World's Shortest Editorial" and claimed that first 
. . . 8 amendment protection ts appropnate. 
Nonetheless, plaintiffs are aggressively pursuing fraud and 
liability theories that question both the traditional First 
Amendment protection enjoyed by the rating agencies and their 
government-sanctioned role in "certifying" the safety of the 
securities they rated. The SEC is likewise moving to curb the 
conflicts of interest that led to ratings shopping and inflated 
assessments. 
ARE CREDIT RATING AGENCIES ENTITLED TO FIRST 
AMENDMENT PROTECTION? 
A. Are Credit Rating Agencies Journalists? 
The process of newsgathering is a protected right under the 
First Amendment, albeit a qualified one. This qualified right, 
which results in the joumalist's privilege, emanates from the 
strong public policy supporting the unfettered communication 
of information by journalists to the public. Ratings put forth by 
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a credit rating agency may qualify as newsgathering under 
certain circumstances. This is true if the information provided 
by the credit agency is a matter of public concern and is 
opinion, not factual. 9 
Statements of fact may be proven, and if false, are subject 
to defamation or fraud claims, whereas statements of opinion 
are not provable ... "a statement of opinion relating to matters 
of public concern which does not contain a provably false 
factual connotation will receive full constitutional 
protection."10 As stated in the Enron case, " In other words, if a 
statement "cannot reasonably [be] interpreted as stating actual 
facts," it is shielded by the First Amendment. 11 As factors to 
consider in the determination of whether a statement can 
reasonably be interpreted as one of fact, the court may examine 
the language employed, e.g., whether it is " loose, figurative, or 
hyperbolic language which would negate the impression" that 
it was a statement of fact, as well as the context of the 
statement and the "general tenor of the article." 12 
B. Matter of Public or Private Concern? 
The information provided by the credit rating agency must 
be of public concern in order to receive protection. For 
example in the Enron case, the court pointed out that "The 
sheer size of the .. .litigation, not to mention the numerous 
related criminal actions, attests to the public import of Enron 
and its sudden collapse in 200 1. '"3 The court went on to say 
"that while there is no automatic, blanket, absolute First 
Amendment protection for reports from the credit rating 
agencies based on their status as credit rating agencies, the 
courts generally have shielded them from liability for allegedly 
negligent ratings for various reasons."14 
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On the other hand, if the matter is one of private rather than 
public concern, then the court will not protect the credit rating 
agency. In Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, 
Inc. 15, D&B prepared a credit report concerning Greenmoss 
Builders that contained the erroneous information that 
Greenmoss had filed for bankruptcy, when in fact it had not. 
Upon learning of the error, D&B sent a correction to the five 
creditors who had received the report, but Greenmoss was not 
satisfied and sued for libel. In one of the few decisions to so 
hold, the U.S. Supreme Court emphasized that " ' [ w ]hether ... 
speech addresses a matter of public concern must be 
determined by (the expression's] content, form, and context ... 
as revealed by the whole record. "'16 Here, the Supreme Court 
found that the credit report of a private construction contractor 
was not entitled to First Amendment protection because it 
concerned "no public issue, ... [but] was speech solely in the 
interest of the speaker and its specific business audience," since 
it concerned solely a private plaintiff and was sent to only five 
subscribers who were under agreement to keep the information 
confidential. 17 Therefore the report did not involve any "strong 
interest in the free flow of commercial information" that would 
"ensure that 'debate on public issues [will] be uninhibited, 
b d .d ,,,g ro ust, an WI e-open. 
Similarll, in the In re Nat '! Enters,_ 
Inv. Litig., 1 the plamtiffs sued Moody s and Fttch for gtvmg 
National Century notes their highest credit ratings, which the 
plaintiffs claimed they relied on to purchase the notes. National 
Century subsequently went bankrupt. The Court found that the 
notes in question were issued by a privately-held company and 
"targeted to a select class of institutional investors with the 
resources to invest tens of millions of dollars in the notes. And 
the only place that the ratings are alleged to have appeared 
were in the offering materials given to the select class of 
investors."20 Since the ratings were not published to the 
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investing public at large, Moody's and Fitch were denied First 
Amendment protection. 
If the information gathered by the credit agency is not 
disseminated to the public, but is published for example, on a 
website, it may not be "public" information. This was the case 
in American Savings Bank, FSB v. UBS PaineWebber21 holding 
that no journalistic privilege applied. Here, Paine Webber made 
investment recommendations to American Savings Bank, 
based on information that PaineWebber received from Fitch. 
The matter before the court involved discovery of information 
provided by Fitch, for which Fitch claimed a journalistic 
privilege. The court found two factors significant. First, 
Fitch's primary means of disseminating information to both its 
subscribers and the public was on its website; and secondly, 
Fitch performed its ratings based on a private, contractual 
agreement for a fee. Finding that Fitch rarely performed its 
services without a fee, the court held that "research conducted 
for a fee cannot be journalism."22 In an ancillary case the 
Second Circuit also held that Fitch was not entitled to a 
journalistic privilege because, unlike a business newspaper or 
magazine, which would cover any transactions deemed 
newsworthy, Fitch only "covers" its own clients. "We believe 
this practice weighs against treating Fitch as a journalist. This 
practice, of course, contrasts noticeably with Standard & Poor's 
practice (as described in Pan Am) of rating nearly all public 
debt issuances regardless of whether it was hired to do so or 
not."23 
C. Can Rating Agencies Claim First Amendment Protection 
When They Helped to Create the Product They Rated? 
David Grace, a noted securities lawyer, made an illustrative 
comparison between rating agencies and a restaurant critic. 24 If 
a critic merely goes to a restaurant, eats a meal and then writes 
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a review, he is clearly expressing his opinion. However, if the 
critic was actually involved in the preparation of the meal in 
the kitchen then he is not just writing his opinion. 25 ln the case 
of ratings assigned to derivative products, the rating agencies 
were actually present in the board rooms of investment banks 
engaged in bundling these securities. Given that vested 
interest, plaintiffs argue that the rating agencies should lose the 
protection associated with free speech. 
Many angry investors also claim that the ratings are 
actually products and when these products were consumed 
(relied upon) by investors they were hurt. As such, rating 
agencies could be sued on the grounds of selling a 
product much like a manufacture of a toaster that bursts mto 
flames. Indeed, the analysts themselves were unsure about the 
rating process and the models they were using to come up with 
26 1 d . ratings for the structured products. It was revea e . m 
Congressional hearings that the debt analysts may have fmled 
to recognize the higher level of risk associated with these 
derivative products and were engaged in giving out ratings to 
any issuer who paid for them. 27 As the real estate bubble grew, 
Moody's, Fitch and S&P doubled their revenues from $3 
billion in 2002 to $6 billion in 2007.28 One recent complaint 
filed against the big three alleges that they "'failed to conduct 
due diligence and willingly assigned the highest ratings to 
... impaired instruments since they received substantial fees 
from the issuers '" and that this "cozy relationship" resulted in ' . 29 inflated ratings based on an outdated ratmg methodology. 
D. Applying the First Amendment Shield 
Still reeling from the subprime implosion, government and 
private investors are testing the extent of the First Amendment 
protection. ln the pending case of Abu Dhabi Commercial 
Bank v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 30 institutional investors King 
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County, Washington and Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank 
brought a class action to recover losses stemming from a 
liquidation of notes issued by a structured investment vehicle. 
The eight defendants include S&P and Moody's. The rating 
agencies claimed in their motion for summary judgment that 
they are entitled to immunity under the First Amendment, but 
the court disagreed. Noting that under "typical" circumstances 
the First Amendment normally protects rating agencies subject 
to an "actual malice" exception, the court relied on the 
Greenmoss and National Century cases (supra), stating that 
"where a rating agency has disseminated their ratings to a 
select group of investors rather than to the public at large, the 
rating agency is not afforded the same protection. "31 The court 
also rejected the defendants' argument that their ratings were 
opinions. The judge found that the plaintiffs had sufficiently 
alleged that the rating agencies did not genuinely or reasonably 
believe the ratings they assigned to the rated notes to be 
accurate or to have a basis in fact. "As a result, the Rating 
Agencies' ratings were not mere opinions but rather actionable 
· · " 32 F h h d fi misrepresentatiOns. or t e same reasons, t e e endants' 
disclaimers that "(a) credit rating represents a Rating Agency's 
opinion regarding credit quality and is not a guarantee of 
performance or a recommendation to buy, sell or hold any 
securities," were deemed unavailing to protect the defendants 
from liability for promulgating misleading ratings. 33 
CONGRESSIONAL AND SEC RESPONSES 
In addition to First Amendment protection, ratings agencies 
also have been shielded from liability for everything except 
fraud under federal securities law.34 In 2006, Congress passed 
the Credit Rating Reform Act (CRARA), pursuant to which the 
SEC liberalized the ground rules whereby a credit rating 
agency can become an NRSRO. Although that act achieved its 
goal of expanding the number of NRSROs, it did nothing to 
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prevent the inflated ratings so intertwined with the 
meltdown.35 Nor did it significantly increase competitiOn, as 
Moody's, Fitch and S&P still maintain an 85% market share. 
Relatively weak new rules were enacted, but they still did not 
tackle the "critic-for-hire" problem. 36 
The SEC's new rules were released in the Federal Register 
on November 23, 2009, and went into effect in June, 2010? 7 
When an issuer, underwriter or other offering participant uses a 
credit rating to market its securities, more credit ratings history 
and disclosure are required in the prospectus and registration 
statements. Disclosure must include general information 
regarding the scope of the credit rating, potential of 
interest (such as other services and fees paid to the credit ratmg 
agency), and all preliminary or final credit ratings obtained 
from other credit rating agencies for the same class of 
securities. The last requirement is designed to help investors 
identify potential instances of ratings shopping. 38 The SEC has 
deferred, however, consideration of a rule that would have 
required NRSROs to report the ratings methodologies and 
particular credit risk characteristics for structured finance 
39 products. 
Under CRARA, the substance of credit ratings and the 
procedure and methodologies by which NRSROs 
those ratings were protected from SEC and state regulatiOn, 
though there was a narrow exception for state actions brought 
on tort grounds. The federal preemption defense may come 
into play as state attorneys general seek redress in the 
foreclosure crisis. For example, in 2008, Connecticut attorney 
general Richard Blumenthal filed suit against the credit rating 
agencies on a fraud theory, alleging violation of Connecticut's 
Unfair Trade Practices Act.40 
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Pressure to enact stiffer regulations intensified in the 
months leading up to the passage of the sweeping Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection Act, signed into law July of 
2010 (Financial Reform Act). 41 In December of2009, the SEC 
had announced that it was considering rescinding Rule 436(g) 
which insulated NRSROs from potential liability under Section 
11 of the Securities Act for material misstatements or 
omissions in a registration statement.42 The Financial Ref01m 
Act eliminated the exemption.43 NRSROs and other credit 
rating agencies will now be on an equal footing. Companies 
that include a credit rating in their registration statement will 
need to obtain the consent of the rating agency for the use of its 
name in the prospectus, in the same manner as consent is 
required from auditors. The rationale is clear: when ratings 
are used to sell securities, investors rely on NRSROs as 
experts, and they should be subject to the same liability as are 
other experts, such as auditors. Rescission of Rule 436(g) 
should cause rating agencies to improve the quality of their 
ratings and analysis in order to reduce their risk of liability. 44 
The Financial Reform Act embraces many of the provisions 
that were included in related House and Senate Bills introduced 
in 2009.45 The Rating Accountability and Transparency 
Enhancement Act (the RATE Act), incorporated under Title V, 
Subtitle B, of the Financial Reform Act, requires the SEC to 
review credit ratings and methodologies employed by 
NRSROs. It also directs the SEC to create and enforce rules to 
prohibit, or manage and disclose conflicts of interest, as well as 
to establish a compliance office. A critical component of the 
RATE Act is to modify the scienter requirement in a private 
action for monetary damages against an NRSRO. It will be 
sufficient for plaintiffs to state with particularity acts giving 
rise to a strong inference that the NRSRO knowingly or 
recklessly failed either to conduct a reasonable investigation of 
the rated security or to obtain reasonable, independent 
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verification of the factual elements relied on to evaluate credit 
. k 46 ns . 
Congress also directed the SEC to study and report within a 
year on ( 1) a system that assigns NRSROs on a rotating basis 
to issuers seeking a credit rating; (2) the effect of new 
requirements on NRSRO registration; (3) credit ratings of 
different classes of bonds; ( 4) meaningful multidigit ratings 
system; and (5) ratings standardization. The Comptroller 
General must likewise study and report to Congress on the 
implementation of the RATE Act, including ( 1) the 
appropriateness of relying on ratings for use in federal, state, 
and local securities and banking regulations, as well as for 
determining capital requirements; (2) the effect of liability in 
private actions due to rescission of Rule 436(g); (3) alternative 
means for compensating credit rating agencies that would 
create incentives for accurate credit ratings; and ( 4) alternative 
to assess credit risk, including market-based 
measures. 
ARE THE PROBLEMS BETTER LEFT IN THE INVISIBLE 
HANDS OF THE FREE MARKET? 
One of the solutions proposed to address this crisis was to 
do nothing and leave it to market forces to assign a value to the 
work done by the raters. Not surprisingly, one of the strongest 
supporters of this solution has been Deven Sharma, President 
of S & p .48 He argued that the NRSRO ratings were 
interpreted by some investors as a "government seal of 
approval" instead of using them as one piece of additional 
information they could use to assess risk. If investor rating 
requirements are removed, newer ratings agencies can enter the 
market facilitating appropriate flow of capital through the debt 
ratings. 
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There is no broad support for such as argument. If history 
has taught us anything it is that: 
• Ratings agencies will continue to have conflicts of 
interest and analysts will get "routinely bullied" by the 
companies paying for such ratings. 49 
• Only a handful of rating agencies have been dominating 
the industry for several decades and without proper 
reforms there is no room for any new small agency to 
enter the industry. 
• Some experts believe that imposing explicit disclosure 
requirements may force the agencies to take their debt 
ratings more seriously. If the disclosure rules pertain to 
historical facts such as the relationship between the 
ratings and the actual defaults, this type of information 
could be fairly easy to file with no major resistance 
from the agencies. However, if the rules require the 
agencies to disclose immediately information such as 
the data & the proprietary methodology used, the raters 
may be reluctant to comply with the rules as they may 
not be able to make any money for the ratings. Any 
disclosure rules imposed on the ratings agencies would 
necessarily require a reasonable time frame during 
which the agencies need to complete the necessary 
paperwork. 50 Such a lag in time would defeat the 
purpose of extra disclosure as the investors would have 
already made their decision based on the assigned 
ratings. 
• Requiring additional labels (e.g. S for structured 
products) may not be helpful, especially if in the future 
any products are introduced by the investment banks 
37/ Vol25/ North East Journal of Legal Studies 
under new non-derivative sounding names.51 Usually 
rules and regulations lag significantly behind the new 
changes taking place in the marketplace and do not win 
at the catch-up game. 
In other words, the only viable change that may effectively 
protect investors is to give them the power to sue the raters 
under expanded theories of liability. 
CONCLUSION 
Unlike Enron, where the ratings agencies had no reason to 
know that the company's managers and auditors were engaged 
in systematic fraud and manipulation of the company's balance 
sheet, in the instant cases, the rating agencies were actively 
involved in structuring the very products they rated. States, 
institutional and private investors alike were caught in the 
subprime implosion. The rating agencies should not be 
allowed to hide behind either the First Amendment or their 
government-sanctioned status as NRSROs. Courts should hold 
these agencies responsible for their misrepresentations, and 
Congress has appropriately responded with strong new 
regulation and expanded liability for private actions under the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Rating agencies should be 
treated as experts and held to the same standard as auditors. 
The SEC's and Comptroller General's reports to Congress next 
year on implementation of the RATE Act will be critical in 
assessing what further steps should be taken to regulate the 
credit rating system as part of the larger agenda of achieving 
true financial reform. 
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IRS PRESSES FOR TRANSPARENCY 
ON TAX ACCRUALS 
By 
Martin H. Zern * 
The art of taxation consists in so plucking the goose as to 
procure the greatest quantity of feathers with the least possible 
amount of hissing. 
- JEAN-BAPTISTE COLBERT 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Recently, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) announced 
that corporations and businesses generally will be required to 
reflect on their tax returns any tax position that is considered 
inconsistent with Financial Accounting Standard Board 
(FASB) Interpretation No. 48, Accounting for Uncertainty in 
Income Taxes, or similar financial reporting standards. 1 To this 
end, the IRS has developed a new form (Form 1120 Schedule 
UTP) that will have to be filed annually by some corporations.2 
Clearly, the IRS is seeking more transparency from 
corporations and businesses in general regarding their tax 
planning ventures, which some may categorize as tax evasion 
schemes or even scams. No doubt the government's stance is 
attributable to its need for more revenue and the overall tone of 
hostility by much of the general public to large corporations in 
light of the recent - and perhaps continuing - financial crisis. 
Many believe that corporations are unfairly reducing their tax 
liability by utilization of aggressive corporate tax shelters that 
often have no purpose other than tax reduction. 
